Moving the KORUS FTA forward in a time of economic uncertainty by Stangarone, Troy
Despite the clear benefi ts of KORUS FTA for 
the United States and Korea, it has been stalled 
for nearly 18 months due to disputes over U.S. 
beef and the sale of U.S. autos in Korea. While 
the diffi culties over U.S. beef have largely been 
resolved, the onset of the fi nancial crisis and the 
ensuing economic recession in the United States 
have only further clouded the agreement’s pros-
pects.
Prior to the current crisis, the diffi culties with the 
auto provisions of KORUS FTA were more about 
the declining position of the U.S. auto industry in 
the United States than any specifi c provisions in 
the agreement itself. The current fi nancial crisis 
has pushed the U.S. auto industry to the brink of 
collapse, reinforcing the industry’s need to pro-
tect its position in the U.S. market, which is the 
world’s largest.
With the prospect of the deepest recession in the 
United States in at least a quarter century and 
the uncertain prospects for the U.S. auto indus-
try, it is time for Korea and the United States to 
consider policy solutions that refl ect the changed 
economic and political realities. Without doing 
so, the KORUS FTA will continue to face an un-
certain future.
The Trouble With Autos
For years the U.S. auto industry has faced a tar-
iff, tax, and regulatory structure in Korea that has 
inhibited the United States’ ability to sell cars 
exported to Korea. However, the United States 
is not the only country that has failed to crack 
the Korean market, as imports account for only 
around fi ve percent of all of the cars sold in Ko-
rea. In contrast, imports accounted for slightly 
less than 30 percent of the U.S. market in 2007 
according to Automotive News.
While the inability of any foreign auto producer 
to thrive as an importer in Korea is a testament 
to the barriers that have been in place, it does not 
demonstrate that the KORUS FTA does not ade-
quately address these barriers. More importantly, 
the nature of the disparities in auto sales between 
Korea and the United States is much more com-
plex than it might seem at fi rst glance. 
While Korea sold nearly 775,000 cars in the Unit-
ed States in 2007, it is often cited that the United 
States sold only 6,500 cars in Korea. However, 
the real sales and production fi gures are much 
more complex than this disparity would indicate. 
Prior to the current fi nancial crisis, sales of autos 
in the United States were around 16.5 million, 
while sales in Korea were only around 1 million. 
The signifi cant gap in size of the Korean and U.S. 
markets means that there will always be a dispar-
ity in the sales totals.
Even with a structural gap, the sale of 6,500 U.S. 
vehicles in Korea last year is still signifi cantly 
smaller than one might expect. In 2007, Korea 
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2had approximately 5 percent of the U.S. market for 
automobiles. If the United States had an equiva-
lent market share in Korea, its sales would rise 
to around 50,000 units. Even if the United States 
gained 20 percent of the Korean market, it would 
sell around 200,000 vehicles.
However, one should be skeptical of claims that the 
United States sold only 6,500 vehicles in Korea in 
2007. U.S. companies sell cars in Korea that are 
produced there, as well as cars that are imported 
from Europe. The location of production matters, 
especially when considering the impact of U.S. car 
sales on jobs in the United States and corporate 
profi ts. 
While the offi cial import sales statistics show that 
the Big 3 sold only 6,500 cars in Korea last year, the 
fi gure does not include vehicles produced by GM’s 
Korean subsidiary, GM Daewoo. Last year, it had 
sales of more than 125,000 vehicles. If these are in-
cluded in the U.S. sales fi gure, sales by U.S. owned 
automobile companies rise to nearly 135,000, giv-
ing the United States 12.8% of the Korean market 
— signifi cantly more than Korea’s market share in 
the United States.
In contrast, the 775,000 vehicles Korea sold in the 
United States include 250,000 that were made at 
the Hyundai plant in Alabama. In the long run, the 
number of vehicles Korea sells that are produced 
in the United States will rise as Hyundai brings its 
Kia factor in Georgia on-line, increasing Korea’s 
total production capacity in the United States to 
600,000 units per year.
These differences matter, as historically the United 
States has moved production to the area of sale 
rather than exporting from the United States. This 
means that U.S. sales in Korea can increase with-
out signifi cantly reducing the autos trade defi cit or 
creating jobs in the United States. 
This structure of trade is likely to continue in the 
future.  Korea currently has one of the most ag-
gressive FTA policies in the world. In addition to 
the FTA with the United States, it is close to con-
cluding an agreement with the EU, and is likely to 
begin negotiations with China in the near future. 
Should Korea conclude agreements with all of its 
considered partners, including the United States, it 
would have FTAs with countries representing more 
than 90 percent of global GDP. This will make it 
easier to service the Korean market from the most 
economically viable production plant for each of 
the Big 3.
The Global Financial And Economic Crisis
The current global crisis has changed the politics 
of the KORUS FTA. The U.S. Congress has never 
knowingly approved an FTA during a recession. 
With the recent announcement that the United 
States has been in a recession for the past year, and 
the expectation that this could be the deepest reces-
sion in at least the last quarter century, it is unlikely 
that this trend will be broken anytime soon. 
If the trend is to change, it will likely be with a 
trading partner that already receives signifi cant 
U.S. preferences, rather than a nation with which 
the United States still maintains a signifi cant tariff 
schedule. The pending FTAs with Panama and Co-
lombia could fi t this profi le, as they are currently 
recipients of U.S. preferences, while Korea and the 
United States still maintain a wide range of tariffs. 
However, once the FTA is implemented 95 percent 
of tariffs will be eliminated after three years.
The crisis has also hit the U.S. auto industry hard. 
As the economy has worsened and the fi nancial 
crisis set in, it has seen sales collapse in the United 
States from 16.5 million units in 2007 to an ex-
pected 13.6 million this year. Even generally strong 
companies, such as Toyota, have seen sales drop by 
over 30 percent in the recent monthly fi gures.
With unemployment in the United States at 6.7 per-
cent and the possibility that it could rise as high 
as 9 or 10 percent in the next year, Congress will 
likely act soon on some form of bailout or restruc-
turing program for the U.S. auto industry. If Con-
3gress failed to act and the Big 3 ceased operations, 
the Center for Automotive Research has estimated 
that it would mean the loss of 3 million jobs. Even 
the loss of only 50 percent of the Big 3’s capacity 
could lead to the loss of nearly 2.5 million jobs be-
cause of the integrated nature of the industry.
Flexibility Would Benefi t Korea and the United 
States
In submitting their proposals for assistance to Con-
gress on December 2, Ford and GM identifi ed 2011 
and 2012 as the respective estimates for when they 
would potentially become profi table again. Even 
with a bailout, the U.S. industry could face a tur-
bulent future. Industry sales are expected to trend 
down slightly next year and, according to the Fi-
nancial Times, could ultimately settle at a level that 
will only allow for the viability of two of the Big 3 
domestic auto producers.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. auto in-
dustry and its importance to the passage of the KO-
RUS FTA in the United States, both sides should 
consider ways to temporarily mitigate the impact 
the agreement will have on the U.S. auto sector. 
This would allow both countries to begin experi-
encing the benefi ts of the agreement in other sec-
tors.
One option would be to temporarily suspend the 
provisions relating to trade in autos. While the FTA 
currently calls for a three year phase-out of U.S. 
tariffs and an immediate lifting of Korean tariffs 
on autos, a temporary suspension would offer two 
benefi ts. First, the U.S. industry would not face in-
creased competition from Korea while it undertakes 
a signifi cant restructuring in its home market, and, 
should that restructuring be successful, it would be 
in a better position to utilize the provisions in the 
FTA to expand its share in the Korean market.
However, any suspension of the FTA’s auto provi-
sions would not be permanent, and would need to 
be structured with clear guidelines on what signs of 
health in the U.S. industry would trigger resump-
tion of the provisions. These could be a period of 
consecutive quarters of health by the U.S. industry 
as a whole, or the completion of the conversion of 
factories to produce more fuel effi cient cars. What-
ever the metric, any agreement would also need to 
cap the suspended period for the possibility that the 
U.S. auto industry is unable to meet those metrics 
in a reasonable period of time.
These are unique economic times for both the U.S. 
economy and the U.S. auto industry. The current 
recession could extend through much of 2009, 
while the U.S. auto industry does not expect to see 
its fortunes improve until perhaps 2011. Suspend-
ing the auto provisions of the FTA could provide 
the fl exibility all sides need to move the agreement 
forward. 
This past spring, as daily protests over U.S. beef 
fi lled the streets of Seoul, the United States worked 
with Korea to fi nd a politically acceptable way to 
relieve the crisis. Now the United States is facing 
a potentially much more critical crisis, and Korea 
could strengthen the alliance by showing similar 
fl exibility in the United States’ time of need. 
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